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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES.

THE

STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW rests on

two fundamental hopes:

first, that the nations of the world can agree on principles of international law, and second, that those principles can be used to judge and

ultimately regulate tle conduct of nations. An evolving acceptance of the
legal doctrine, according to this model, corresponds with the incremental
establishment of the rule of law for the world of nations. Given this model

of a steady growth in consensual principles, scholars in international law
ask several basic questions about the People's Republic of China: in particular, what principles of international law do the Chinese leaders profess to follow, and to what extent do these principles diverge from those
accepted in the West? The answers to these doctrinal questions will serve
to elucidate the prospects for an international law. In addition, the study
of Chinese-supported principles of international law has a more immediate practical significance, especially when we examine such topics as the
law of treaties. As we increase our ties with China, and as critics question
the reliability of the Chinese in keeping treaty commitments, it is important to know what treaty law the Chinese purport to apply. Reliability
self-evidently depends on the standard applied to the conduct.
Hungdah Chiu, in The People's Republic of China and the Law of
Treaties, attempts to ascertain the principles of the law of treaties supported in theory and in practice by the Chinese leaders. He focuses on
the second, and more practical, question raised above, but his analysis
implicitly asks the fi:rst set of questions. From an apparently exhaustive
survey of Chinese literature on the law of treaties and a study of actual
Chinese treaties, Chiu successfully provides much insight into the topic.
As Chiu shows in some detail, Chinese leaders agree in theory with
a considerable portion of the law of treaties articulated by Western scholars. For example, the Chinese procedure for making bilateral treaties,
which entails the issue of full powers to diplomatic representatives, negotiation, signature, and ratification, coincides with that followed by
Western states.: Similarly, China has generally chosen to recognize the
continuing validity of all boundary treaties concluded by Chinese governments prior to the Communist victory in 1949.2 Moreover, in analyz1 H.
2
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ing problems of treaties, Chinese writers frequently cite Western doctrine for support and quote major Western treatises, particularly Op
penheim's InternationalLaw.3 In short, China and the West to a great
extent apply the same law of treaties.
However, as Chiu also demonstrates, "where differences exist, they are
profound.' 4 Several of these differences merit discussion, both for their
own importance and because they suggest some of the problems with
Chiu's approach to this subject.
A key divergence in doctrine arises from the Chinese distinction between "equal treaties" and "unequal treaties." Equal treaties, which are
to be strictly observed, are those produced by genuine negotiation between or among equal sovereigns. 5 Unequal treaties, those produced by
coercion, are considered void by the Chinese. A typical example of an unequal treaty, according to Chinese writers, is that concluded in 1965
between the United States and Taiwan. 6 The agreement grants American
forces exemptions from taxes and visa requirements, immunity from
local jurisdiction over acts committed in the course of official duty, and
several other privileges. Another example is the treaty between the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia signed in 1968, which gave recognition and
acceptance to the occupation by Soviet troops. Both examples show the
Chinese rejection of treaties which reflect clear inequalities in bargaining
power. In addition, they suggest that the concept of unequal treaties can
be used to challenge countless treaties, particularly those opposed on
other grounds.
It should be noted, however, that at least on a superficial level, the
concept of unequal treaties is gaining popularity in the Western world.
In particular, the 1969 United Nations conference on the Law of Treaties
condemned "the threat or use of pressure in any form . . . by any State

in order to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of sovereign equality of
States and freedom of consent." 7 Still, these principles are considered

applicable only to treaties concluded after the issuance of the conference
declaration, and thus do not imply approval of China's practice of challenging older treaties. Moreover, a growth in acceptance of the theory
does not solve the problem of determining which treaties are in fact
termed unequal. This second point, not developed by Chiu, will be discussed below.
3 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
terpacht ed. 1952).
4 Crnu, supra note i, at 119.
5 Id. at 62.
6 Id. at 65.
7Id.

at 62.
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A second major doctrinal divergence, according to Chiu, is in the perceived effect of a revolutionary change in government on the treaty obligations of a state. Western theory holds that even revolutionary changes
in the government or constitution of a state do not invalidate treaties
made by predecessor governments. This principle, consistent with the
Western emphasis on stability, is clearly rejected by the Chinese leaders
despite their acceptance of pre-1949 boundary treaties. Chinese leaders
have repeatedly insisted that after a successful revolution all existing
treaties must be reexamined and, depending on their contents, rejected,
8
revised, or accepted.
Both these doctrinal points show Chinese disagreement with Western
scholars on major issues in the law of treaties, and Chiu clearly and concisely gives the opposing viewpoints. One of the key problems with Chiu's
work, however, is that he confines it to this comparative approach to such
an extent that his conclusions are often of marginal interest or questionable validity. This problem is exacerbated because, although Chinese writers often quote Western treaties, they do not discuss many aspects of the Western law of treaties. For example, Chiu, having stated
that Western writers agree that physical coercion against the representatives of a contracting state vitiates the resulting treaty, goes on to say,
"No Communist Chinese writers appear to comment on the problem.
. . . But, in view of their severe condemnation of coercion or other undue influence exercised against the contracting state itself, a fortiori one
can safely conclude that they also consider that such acts vitiate a treaty."9
If the Chinese disagreed with that principle, it would certainly be worth
noting; but in view of the weak evidence Chiu cites, it hardly seems
worth mentioning that the Chinese oppose such physical coercion. Another short quotation illustrates the same point. It is at best of marginal
significance that, "When the premier of the State Council concludes a
treaty with a foreign state, it is not clear whether the issuance of credentials bearing full powers is required."1°
Moreover, as the first example suggests, Chiu's focus on Western comparisons leads to poorly substantiated conclusions about Chinese doctrine. One notable example is Chiu's effort to determine the Chinese
position on multilateral treaties concluded prior to revolutionary changes
of government. Despite the principle of revolutionary change discussed
earlier, Chiu concludes that China apparently regards such treaties as
valid. This conclusion is based primarily on China's demand to be
seated in the United Nations and several other international groups. In
8 Id. at 92.

9 Id. at 3o.
1l Id. at 32.
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Chiu's words, "Communist China's assertion of rights was necessarily
predicated on a recognition of the continuing validity of the treaties establishing these organizations."11 Acceptance of a general principle can
hardly be inferred from one action, especially when it is obvious that
other political reasons better explain the action. Clearly the United
States does not believe in the principle that land treaties merit no respect,
despite the historical practice of violating such treaties with American
Indian nations. The point is that too often Chiu's zeal for finding Chinese
views on all Western principles leads him to draw such questionable
inferences from isolated Chinese actions.
Furthermore, Chiu's organization around Western principles inhibits
his development of important points in Chinese doctrine, points which
he mentions in passing and which have no counterpart in Western
thought. Especially noteworthy is the distinction made between "reactionary" and "progressive" governments. Chiu invokes this distinction
twice: first, he suggests that "[w]hen two governments are contesting for
the control of a state, the government regarded by Communist China as
'reactionary' is thought of as not competent to conclude certain treaties
on behalf of that state"; 12 and second, he observes that the Chinese may
argue that "a reactionary new regime should not have the right to reject
treaty obligations contracted by an earlier progressive regime."',, Chiu
does not explore the implications of this distinction as it relates to
treaties in general. In fact, this weakness stems as much from another major problem with Chiu's organization as it does from his emphasis on
principles debated in the West.
This problem, not unusual in studies of international law, is that
Chiu attempts to artificially separate political realities and legal principles. While he notes certain areas where political expediency apparently explains China's conduct, and discusses doctrines subject to flexible
interpretations in practice, he avoids coming to grips with the connection between principles and political realities. Thus, he concludes the
book by acknowledging, "the fact that a principle of treaty law is accepted both by Communist China and the West does not guarantee
identical application of the principle. .

.

. [I]n comparison with West-

ern countries, Communist China has shown less concern for purely legal
principles than for political factors."'14 This conclusion, regardless of its
validity, is wholly unsatisfactory. The author does not explain what political factors are involved and when they are significant, leaving the im11 Id. at 94.
12 Id. at 27.
18 Id.at iO.
-4 Id. at 120.
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pression that Chinese treaties are subject to the vicissitudes of political
expediency.
For all nations the law of treaties is part of a hierarchy of accepted
principles and values. For example, no nation will support a treaty aimed
at its own destruction. Self-preservation takes precedence over the integrity of treaties. If we wish to know the reliability of a nation in respect
to treaties, we must know the place of treaty law in the hierarchy of national concerns. Such knowledge, moreover, would help clarify China's
decision to apply otherwise ambiguous doctrines, such as that of unequal
treaties, which disrupt the stable recognition of treaty validity.
Thus, for example, China's commitment to "progressive" governments over "reactionary" ones may be greater than its commitment to
a stable system of treaties. China may place a high value on treaty recognition, but might in some cases place a higher value on its commitment
to change. Such doctrines as unequal treaties and revolutionary change
of governments may not be just broad and ambiguous principles without
some support in the 'West; they arguably represent keys to the hierarchy
of values in China. They help China to accommodate a political commitment to the support of "progressive" regimes.

Whether or not such analysis is valid, it is not enough to argue that
political factors adversely affect China's commitment to a law of treaties.
Chiu has artificially limited his scope to specific principles of the law of
treaties. A more instructive and useful analysis would examine which
treaties, between which parties, and covering what substantive points,
are likely to be accepted by the Chinese.
Despite the gaps and weaknesses in The People's Republic of China
and the Law of Treaties, Chiu has at least provided a succinct and informative source of Chinese treaty doctrine. His discussion, moreover,
is sufficiently informative to push the reader beyond Chiu's formalistic
comparisons and artificial distinctions. In particular, with respect to
foreign policy decisions, we must study more than doctrine to assess the
Chinese commitment to treaties. But even an analysis of doctrine shows
that China and the West currently have rather crucial differences in their
respective attitudes toward treaties. Finally, given the ideological and
political sources of the differences, Chiu's study once again illustrates the
difficulty in building a truly international law of treaties.
Bryant G. Garth
B.A., Yale University, 1972
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